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 1.  Introduction: Normative, Soft, Civilian, or Simply Weak Power? The EU’s Foreign Policy 
Identity 
For decades, debates about European foreign policy more or less focused on the question whether 
there was such a thing as a “European foreign policy”, i.e., the emphasis was on the actorness of the 
EU in foreign policy matters. Christopher Hill’s famous argument about the “capability-expectation 
gap” concerned such actorness (Hill 1993). Today, things have gradually started changing, in paral-
lel to the continuing institutionalization of CFSP/ESDP matters. For the past few years, the schol-
arly  debate  largely  focused  on  the  question  “what  characterizes  this  European  foreign  policy” 
(Sjursen  2006b,  169).  Various  concepts  are  floating  around  in  the  discourse:  “Venus”  (Kagan 
2003); “normative power Europe” (Manners 2002); “postmodern state” (Cooper 2000); “civilian 
power” (Duchêne 1972).  
These conceptualizations – for all their differences and their analytical weaknesses (see below) – 
share two features: First, they recognize that the EU indeed has a distinctive foreign policy by now 
and that, thus, the EU has emerged as an international actor. Even if – as (neo-) realists such as 
Robert Kagan or Adrian Hyde-Price do (Kagan 2003; Hyde-Price 2006) – one explains the specific 
features of this foreign policy with its lack of (military) capabilities and with its intergovernmental 
decision-making process, the actorness of the EU in world affairs is no longer in doubt. This in it-
self is a significant development in the scholarly reflection of European foreign policy which should 
not be overlooked. 
Second, the four concepts mentioned above engage in identity discourse, whether explicitly or im-
plicitly. As Thomas Diez points out, “the discourse of the EU as a normative power [or civilian 
power, for that matter. TAB/T.R.] constructs a particular self of the EU” (Diez 2005: 614). Identity 
discourse, however, has its own problems, since it easily overlooks the difference between descrip-
tive-analytical and normative statements. Ian Manners’ recent statements are interesting in this con-
text: Only few years after he had coined the term “normative power,” he complains that the so-
called “militarization” of the EU means that it is abandoning an identity that he himself has helped 
constructing  (Manners  2006).  Moreover,  identity  talk  inevitably  relies  on  distinctions  between 
“self” and “other” which take on different forms (see again Diez 2005, 628-629). In the case of the 
EU, its “normative power” identity is often contrasted to the U.S. which overlooks the fact that the 
U.S. has arguably been one of the biggest norm promoters in the international system for decades. 
Hegemonic and other great powers tend to build the international (or the regional) system according 
to their own principles, norms, and rules. Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, the U.S., and now the 
EU have all been “normative powers” in the sense of their attempts and capacities “to shape con-  2 
ceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations” (Manners 2002, 239; see also Diez 2005, on this 
point). Fortunately, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union utterly failed in their attempts, while the 
U.S. post-World War II attempts have been rather successful, particularly with regard to the interna-
tional economic order. In other words, it makes little sense to ascribe a normative quality to a great 
power’s foreign policy identity as long as we do not specify which norms are being promoted. 
Last not least, describing a particular foreign policy identity should not be conflated with explaining 
it. A (neo-) realist account of the EU’s civilian or normative power is an attempt at explanation (see 
Hyde-Price 2006). So is a sociological institutionalist attempt which uses the concept of institu-
tional isomorphism to explain the EU’s policies toward the Mediterranean (Bicchi 2006a). One 
could add another institutionalist story  emphasizing the EU’s peculiar  cross-pillarized decision-
making structure in foreign policy mixing supranational and intergovernmental elements to explain 
why it primarily uses “soft power” instruments. 
This paper does not engage in explanation. Rather, we ask whether the EU’s efforts at the promo-
tion of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, on the one hand, and the ESDP’s increasing 
role in peace-keeping and post-conflict state-building operations, on the other hand, are actually 
consistent with these role identities. For reasons explained below, we stick to the older concept of 
“civilian power” rather than the newer “normative power.” We argue that, yes, the EU’s democracy 
promotion, peace-keeping, and state-building policies have developed into a fairly consistent and 
comprehensive approach of an emerging civilian power. These policies are also implementing the 
EU’s self-description in foreign and security affairs, the “European Security Strategy” (ESS, see 
European Council 2003), in a rather coherent way. This is surprising, for two reasons. First, the EU 
has developed these policies in a very incremental way and through a “trial and error” process 
whereby methods and instruments were often transferred from one policy area to another. Second, 
the EU is not a state. Its foreign policy apparatus still pales compared to the member states and its 
decision-making process in foreign affairs is not only intergovernmental, but also opaque and some-
times even chaotic given its cross-pillarized nature. Nevertheless, the EU has developed into a truly 
civilian world power, which disposes of the entire spectrum of policy instruments necessary to ef-
fectively promote the “civilization” of international relations. 
Note that this paper is confined to analyzing the policies as revealed in the various documents. We 
ask whether the EU actually tries to implement what it professes to do, namely to promote democ-
racy, human rights, the rule of law, “effective multilateralism,” and to contribute to peace and sta-  3 
bility-building.
1 We are not concerned here with the effectiveness of these efforts on the ground. 
We are fully aware of the literature that points to difficulties and outright policy failures (see e.g. 
the constantly updated contributions in “CFSP Forum” provided by FORNET).  
We proceed in the following steps. First, we define what we mean by “civilian power” and develop 
criteria for its evaluation. Second, we review the EU policies for promotion of human rights, de-
mocracy, and the rule of law. Third, we look at the various ESDP missions for peace-, stability- and 
state-building. We conclude with some general observations on the suitability of the concept of “ci-
vilian power.” 
 
2. How Do We Know a Civilian Power When We See One? 
For various reasons, we prefer the concept of “civilian power” over its competitors, in particular in 
comparison to the concept of “normative power.” While the latter has sparked quite a debate in re-
cent years (see particularly the March 2006 issue of the Journal or European Public Policy), we 
agree with Helene Sjursen’s criticism of its vagueness and imprecision (Sjursen 2006a, 236). We 
find Manners’ attempt at defining normative power “that the EU exists as being different to pre-
existing political forms, and that this particular difference predisposes it to act in a normative way” 
(Manners 2002, 242) not only unclear, but bordering to tautology. Moreover, norm promotion is not 
a unique feature of the EU’s foreign policy, but fairly common for the foreign policies of great 
powers, as noted above.  
Last not least, the concept of “normative power” easily leads scholars to fall into the “norms versus 
interest” trap of theorizing (see also Diez 2005, 624-626). Social constructivists in particular should 
recognize that there are no interests outside social norms and that norm promoting agents can be-
have as instrumentally and strategically as other actors. The real issue should rather be which type 
of norms inform and are related to which type of interests. In the case of EU’s foreign policy, the 
“norms versus interests” trap still informs many analyses of its human rights and democracy promo-
tion policies. The argument, for example, that the EU’s norm promotion efforts are driven by alleg-
edly material interests such as security and stability overlooks that a) security and stability are le-
gitimate foreign policy goals and b) that the promotion of democracy and human rights indeed con-
                                                 
1 Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the Workshop on Democracy Promotion, Oct. 4-5, 2004, Center 
for Development, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University, and at the annual Workshop on International 
Negotiation and Conflict Resolution organized by the Department of Diplomacy, National Chengchi University, Taipei, 
March 30, 2006. We thank Frederik Adriaenssens, Tina Freyburg, Pia Niedermeier, and Philip Schunke for research 
assistance as well as Mareike Kleine, Elsa Tulmets, and particularly Vera van Hüllen for their helpful comments and 
suggestions.   4 
tributes to stability in the long run.
2 In other words, there are even many empirical reasons to sug-
gest that “norms” and “interests” cannot be easily disentangled.
3 
At first glance, the concept of “civilian power” shares the weaknesses of the notion of “normative 
power.” If civilian powers are “states which actively promote the ‘civilising’ of international rela-
tions” (Harnisch and Maull 2001b, 3), this borders on the same tautology as to say that “normative 
powers”  promote  norms.  Moreover,  Hedley  Bull  misunderstood  Duchêne’s  original  formula, 
namely that civilian power implies a renunciation of the use of force under almost all circumstances 
rather than emphasizing political and economic over military means to promote one’s interests (see 
Bull 1982; Duchêne 1972). As a result of this early debate, the concept of “civilian power” was of-
ten used as the opposite of “military power,” confusing it almost with pacifism.  
In the meantime, however, and largely overlooked by the English-speaking international relations 
community, German scholars in particular have refined the concept of civilian power as an ideal 
type of foreign policy role identity in the Weberian sense. The Trier-based group of foreign policy 
analysis chaired by Hanns Maull who had written about “civilian power” in 1990 (Maull 1990), 
used it as an analytical tool to evaluate Germany’s post-unification policies (Harnisch and Maull 
2001a; see also Kirste and Maull 1996; Maull 2002). Maull even invoked Germany’s contribution 
to the military intervention in Kosovo in the absence of a UN mandate as a “hard test” for the con-
cept (Maull 2001).  
According to Maull and others, the foreign policy identity of a civilian power is characterized by six 
elements (see Harnisch and Maull 2001b, 4; see also Maull 2001, 124-126): 
1.  efforts to constrain the use of force through cooperative and collective security arrangements; 
2.  efforts to strengthen the rule of law through multilateral cooperation, integration, and partial 
transfers of sovereignty; 
3.  promotion of democracy and human rights, both within and between states; 
4.  promotion of non-violent forms of conflict management and conflict resolution; 
5.  promotion of social equity and sustainable development; 
6.  promotion of interdependence and division of labor. 
                                                 
2   Note, however, that democratization can have significant destabilization fact in the short run (Jünnemann). 
3   Of course, an explanatory story about the EU’s human rights and democracy promotion policies should evaluate the 
proposition that the EU only promotes human rights and democracy to the extent that this is consistent with its secu-
rity and stability goals. Such an account would then suggest that security considerations trump human rights and 
democracy concerns in cases of norm conflict. But such an explanatory story does not need to be framed in “norms 
vs. interests” terms, but remains inside a constructivist ontology.   5 
These elements are actually in line with Sjursen’s suggestion that strengthening the cosmopolitan 
dimension of international law would be a strong indicator for what she calls “normative” or “civi-
lizing” power (Sjursen 2006a, 249). Moreover, the acquisition of military capabilities and the actual 
use of force do not per se disconfirm a civilian power identity. Rather, the issue becomes in what 
type of political strategy military means are embedded, how force is used, and whether the use of 
force is legitimized by the international community. In this sense, the Kosovo intervention repre-
sents indeed a rather extreme test case for the concept.  
In the following, we use “civilian power” as specified above as an analytical tool to evaluate the 
EU’s foreign policy with regard to the promotion of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, 
on the one hand, and its participation in post-conflict peace-keeping and stability-promotion efforts, 
on the other. 
 
3. EU Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy, and the Rule of Law 
Overview 
With the end of the Cold War, democracy promotion has been mainstreamed into the development 
strategies of international organizations such as the UN or the World Bank, but also of individual 
Western states such as the United States, or the Federal Republic of Germany. The European Union 
(EU) is no exception. In fact, the EU has been among the first of any Western state or international 
organization to write human rights, democracy, and the rule of war into its agreements with external 
partners. The Lomé IV agreement of 1989 between the EU and the so-called ACP countries (Afri-
can, Carribean, and Pacific Group, mostly former colonies of Great Britain, France, and Belgium) 
was the first multilateral development agreement to include political conditionality. Ten years later, 
in 1999, the EU adopted the European Initiative for Development and Human Rights (EIDHR) 
regulations (975 and 976/1999) as a comprehensive strategy “in support of democratisation, the 
strengthening of the rule of law and the development of a pluralist and democratic civil society” 
(EIDHR 976/1999, preamble).  
Today, the EU has a comprehensive programme for democracy promotion in place governing all its 
external  relations  with  third  countries.  This  includes  the  so-called  “circle  of  friends”  and  the 
“neighbourhood policies” toward Russia, the so-called Newly Independent States (NIS = former 
Soviet Republics, minus the new EU members in the Baltics, of course), the Balkans, the Southern 
Mediterranean countries, but also EU relations with Africa, Latin America, and Asia. The instru-
ments used by the EU to promote human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and “good governance”   6 
look surprisingly similar across the globe. Moreover, countries with an accession perspective have 
to comply with the Copenhagen criteria of 1993 focussing on democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights, and the protection of minorities before they are entitled to enter accession negotiations. Thus, 
the strategies and policies to promote democracy are similar, and the mechanisms and incentives to 
promote compliance vary only slightly with the type of third country (accession, association, part-
ner, “circle of friends”, other third world countries). In fact, the EU follows quite clearly a specific 
cultural script. 
Thus, democracy promotion has become a centrepiece of the EU’s foreign policy and it is backed 
up by considerable financial and personal resources. Just to give a rough idea: the EU foreign aid 
managed by the EU Commission represents 12% of all international financial aid. Combined with 
foreign aid by individual member states, the EU and its member states account for more than 55% 
of all financial aid worldwide (according to Petiteville 2003, 138, fn.7). While precise data on de-
mocracy promotion funds are hard to come by, the EU and its member states combined spent ca. $ 
900 Mill. on various democracy programmes in 2001, compared to ca. $ 633 Mill. in the USAID 
democracy assistance allocation of the same year (according to Youngs 2003, 128). The new finan-
cial perspective of EIDHR for 2007-2013 envisions an financial envelope of € 1,1 trillion which 
amounts to roughly € 160 million per year to promote civil society efforts promoting human rights 
and democracy.
4 The programming for the new financial perspective is not available yet. But in 
previous period of 2001-2006, EIDHR projects which do not depend on government approval in the 
country where the projects take place, spent about  
•  60% of its resources on democratization, governance, and rule of law issues,  
•  17% on efforts to combat the death penalty and torture as well as support for the international 
judiciary system including the International Criminal Court, 
•  and another17% on fighting racism and supporting minorities as well as indigenous peoples 
(2002-2004 figures, according to Europäische Kommission 2004, 9). 
If we add the democracy and human rights promotion components in programmes such as PHARE 
for the Eastern European accession states (€ 1,5 bln/year), TACIS for Russia and the CIS states, or 
ECHO, the EU’s humanitarian aid programme, the EU’s own funding for democracy, human rights, 
and good governance exceeds comparable U.S. programmes. If we combine it with the funding for 
                                                 
4   Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on establishing 
a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide, OJ L 386, 29.12.2006, p. 1–11, 
Art. 19.   7 
such purposes by EU member states, Europe is probably by far the largest contributor to democracy 
promotion on the globe. 
With the financial perspective of 2007-2013, the EU launched another attempt to mainstream its 
democracy promotion approach. Existing programmes, such as TACIS, CARDS, or MEDA were 
replaced by a whole set of new instruments for development cooperation (DCI), stability (IfS), pre-
accession assistance (IPA), and neighbourhood and partnership (ENPI). This new generation of in-
struments of cooperation is less geared towards specific regions (ACP, NIS, Latin America, West-
ern Balkans) but targets specific types of countries (post-conflict, developing, accession, neighbor-
hood).
5 Moreover, they all contain the explicit goal of democracy promotion supported by a suspen-
sion clause.
6 As a result of this democracy mainstreaming, the Commission had planned to abolish 
EIDHR. But due to the opposition of the European Parliament, which insisted that the EU needed 
an instrument specifically dedicated to the promotion of democracy – without the consent of the 
governments concerned, EIDHR was preserved (see also below).
7 
The various policies and strategies developed through an incremental process of “learning by do-
ing” rather than a great master plan. The instruments adopted were initially developed for the ACP 
countries, then “travelled” simultaneously to the Eastern enlargement process, to Russia, the NIS 
countries, the Mediterranean etc. While there is an explicit effort at exporting European values and 
– most recently – to distinguish these values from overall Western (and US American) ones, the un-
derlying assumption of these programmes implies that the world can be shaped according to Euro-
pean democracy and welfare state standards (including the export of the European model of re-
gional integration). This “our size fits all” (Bicchi 2006a) approach shows little sensitivity for na-
tional or local cultures and values, let alone an effort at exploring functional equivalents for West-
ern democratic statehood in weak, failing, or failed states. National and local considerations only 
come into play through the implementation of the programmes on the ground. The “top down” ap-
proach of EU democracy promotion has only changed very recently with the recognition that is no 
unitary institutional model to promote democratic governance and that efforts have to take into ac-
count the situation inside the particular country (see e.g. Europäische Kommission 2006, 5, 9).  
                                                 
5   The only exception are the ACP countries, whose financial assistance continues to be funded by the European De-
velopment Fund, while the Instrument for development cooperation applies to all the other developing countries 
(Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 establishing a 
financing instrument for development cooperation). 
6   The only exception is the instrument for cooperation with industrialized and other high-income countries and territo-
ries.   8 
We will now briefly examine the history of the various EU efforts at promoting human rights, de-
mocracy, and the rule of law. 
 
EU Development Policy: Towards Economic and Political Conditionality 
Until the end of the 1980s, EU development policy used to be about granting preferential trade 
agreements  and  financial  aid  to  the  former  colonies  of  member  states.  It  centred  on  the  Lomé 
agreements, the first of which was signed in 1975 between the EU and the African, Caribbean, and 
Pacific Group (ACP countries). The Lomé system provided the ACP countries with preferential ac-
cess to the Common Market since they could export almost all their products custom free without 
reciprocating by opening their markets to EU imports (General System of Preferences). Political 
considerations came explicit for the first time in Lomé III (1985-90), which announced the com-
mitment of EU and ACP countries to human dignity (including the value of the human person and 
equality between genders), and economic, social and cultural rights (preamble, Art. 4 and annex I). 
But the agreement did not provide for any sanctions in cases of violation of these norms. Yet, the 
question of the relationship between human rights and development had already been evoked under 
Lomé I (1975-80) when the EU suspended officially channelled aid to Uganda due to the human 
rights violations committed by Idi Amin (leaving humanitarian aid in place, however).  
It was the Lomé IV agreement (1990-2000) that marked the beginning of both economic and politi-
cal conditionality in EU development policy (see also Santos 2006 for the following). In previous 
agreements, the ACP countries had successfully prevented the EU from introducing clauses on de-
mocracy and human rights. Lomé IV, by contrast, included provisions on democracy, human rights, 
and the rule of law for the first time, without, however, linking them to specific sanctions. The revi-
sion of Lomé IV upgraded the provisions on democracy, human rights and the rule of law making 
them into the essential condition for development cooperation with the EU (Art. 5). Art. 5 of the 
Lomé IV bis Convention also mentions good governance for the first time as a particular aim of co-
operation operations excluding it, however, from the essential elements of the agreement. Most im-
portantly, Lomé IV bis implemented the two-track approach to development cooperation which the 
Council laid out in its Resolution on Human Rights, Democracy, and Development.
8 The pro-active 
promotion of these principles through financial assistance (indicative programmes) and open and 
constructive dialogue (political dialogue; Art. 30.3) is complemented by re-active sanctions in case 
                                                                                                                                                                  
7   We thank Vera van Hüllen for this important insight from her own study on democracy promotion in the Mediterra-
nean.  
8   Resolution of the European Council, November 28, 1991, OJ EEC 11-1991: 122ff.   9 
of their violation. For violations of democracy, human rights and rule of law, however, the EU in-
voked the suspension clause several times in the 1990s, e.g. against Nigeria, Rwanda, Burundi, Ni-
ger, and Sierra Leone (Holland 2002: 134).  
The Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000 and valid until 2020, terminated the Lomé system. Not 
only does Cotonou reiterate the nexus introduced by Lomé IV between development, democracy, 
human rights, the rule of law, and good governance (preamble). It broadens the scope of develop-
ment cooperation to peace-building and conflict prevention stressing “an integrated approach taking 
account at the same time political, economic, social, cultural and environmental aspects of devel-
opment” (Art. 1.2). Moreover, political conditionality was strengthened. Title II develops the politi-
cal dialogue introduced by Lomé IV bis into a pro-active instrument of conflict prevention in the 
area of peace-keeping, human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and good governance. Art. 8.2 
stresses the preventive character of the political dialogue which shall preclude the use of sanctions. 
It shall foster the exchange of information and the development of a mutual understanding of the 
meaning and application of the principles and strategies laid down in the Convention. 
The underlying approach corresponds closely to the Open Method of Coordination (e.g. Hodson 
and Maher 2001). Unlike in previous Lomé Agreements, the EU no longer unilaterally imposes cer-
tain development policies. Rather, goals and principles shall be formulated in consensus with the 
developing countries and jointly evaluated on the basis of formerly agreed benchmarking criteria. 
Periodic monitoring, evaluation, and peer review shall induce processes of mutual learning through 
the diffusion of best practice. These processes of coordination are complemented by reinforced ef-
forts at capacity building. In Cotonou, capacity-building is no longer confined to the public sector 
but includes the strengthening of civil society (Art. 7). Non-governmental actors, including the pri-
vate sector, have a right to be consulted and incorporated into the political dialogue. They shall get 
involved in projects funded under Cotonou, and finally, qualify for support of organizational capac-
ity building and financial assistance. Yet, soft coordination and capacity building still take place in 
the shadow of sanctions. The suspension clause is retained and extended to good governance, but 
only as far as serious cases of corruption are concerned, which significantly narrows the enforceable 
parts of good governance.  
Unlike under previous agreements, EU financial assistance, mostly provided by the European De-
velopment Fund, has become conditional upon the performance of the recipient country with regard 
to certain indicators including the implementation of reforms on democracy, human rights, the rule 
of law, and good governance (Art. 3.1b, Annex IV; for an excellent assessment see Beck and Con-
zelmann 2004). In contrast to Lomé IV, the EU now has complete discretion in the allocation of its   10 
development funds (Art. 3, Annex IV, 57.5). The decision, however, which specific programmes 
and projects are to be funded with how much money is subject to negotiations with the individual 
recipient countries as specified in Art. 4.3 Annex IV. Since the conditions for resource allocation 
are no longer fixed by the agreement but to be negotiated, the procedural regulations create a strong 
incentive for the recipient countries to comply with the principles guiding EU development policy. 
In sum, EU development policy changed significantly during the 1990s. The EU has subsequently 
institutionalized democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance as the guiding 
principles of its development policy. In order to promote these principles, the EU gives priority to a 
“positive approach” outlined in the Council Resolution on human rights, democracy, and develop-
ment in 1991. Rather than pressuring recipient countries into compliance, an “open and constructive 
dialogue” is supposed to stimulate the respect for human rights and encourage democracy.  
 
EU Enlargement Policy: From Association to Accession  
Eastern enlargement has been the most ambitious effort of the EU to promote democracy, human 
rights, and the rule of law in third countries. The prospect of membership helped transform ten for-
mer communist countries into consolidated liberal democracies with functioning market economies 
in less than 15 years. Since so much has been written on Eastern enlargement, we can be rather brief 
here (e.g. Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Grabbe 2003; 
Gheciu 2005).  
After the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the EU started to shift its priorities 
from the ACP countries to the transition countries. However, the EU used policy tools developed in 
its cooperation agreements with the ACP countries and adapted them to the situation in Central 
Eastern Europe. The so called Europe-Agreements were meant to support the economic, political 
and social transition in Central and Eastern Europe. They contained provisions on democracy, hu-
man rights, and the rule of law, complemented by suspension clauses in 1992 making accession and 
financial aid conditional upon compliance with democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law, 
and market economy. The 1993 Copenhagen European Council then formally accepted the possibil-
ity of membership of all associated CEE countries – provided that they achieve (1) a functioning 
market economy; (2) stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and 
respect for and protection of minorities, and market economy, and (3) the ability of implementing 
the  acquis  communautaire  (Copenhagen  criteria).  Thus,  the  Europe-Agreements  became  the 
framework for the applicant countries’ integration into the EU.    11 
In order to help accession countries comply with the Copenhagen criteria, the EU installed similar 
mechanisms as in development policy. The PHARE programme (Poland and Hungary Aid for Eco-
nomic Reconstruction)
9 has provided 1,5 billion Euro per year of financial assistance to prepare the 
candidates for institution-building, adopting the acquis, and implementing Structural Funds after 
accession (cf. Bailey and de Propris 2004). But the focus of PHARE has been on capacity-building 
in the public sector rather than on supporting political reforms.  
Although not specified in the PHARE regulations, countries seeking access for financial assistance 
had to provide clear commitments regarding the rule of law, respect for human rights, establishment 
of a multiparty system, the holding of free elections, and introducing a market economy (Maresceau 
2003). Consequently, the EU never resorted to negative political conditionality suspending the as-
sociation agreements. It has, however, delayed the conclusion of accession agreements and the pro-
vision of financial aid with Rumania and Bulgaria in order to encourage political and economic re-
forms. Next to the “carrots” and “sticks” provided by political conditionality of the Europe-Agree-
ments, the EU has relied on political dialogue. Regular bilateral meetings at the highest political 
level between the EU and the individual candidate countries allowed for consultations and the ex-
change of views on all topics of common interest related to the enlargement process. Comparable to 
EU development policy, the political dialogues have been crucial to clarify the conditions for (open-
ing negotiations for) membership.  
Moreover, the Commission monitored the performance of each candidate and reported the progress 
in  an  annual  report  presented  to  the  Council  together  with  recommendations  for  improvement. 
These annual progress reports, first published in 1997, introduced a system of benchmarking be-
tween the accession candidates. The annual progress reports have also included an assessment of 
the political Copenhagen criteria, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and minority rights (cf. 
Kochenov 2004).
10 Moreover, the Commission and the European Parliament would officially repri-
mand accession countries for cases of serious non-compliance with these principles (Maresceau 
2003). Thus, political dialogue has always taken place “in the shadow of accession” (membership 
conditionality). 
                                                 
9   Initially meant to help Poland and Hungary make the transition to market economy, PHARE was quickly extended 
to other transition countries preparing them for EU membership. 
10   Note that protecting minority rights is not included in the Treaties. Thus, the EU requires accession countries to 
comply with standards that do not apply to member states. For details on EU policies concerning minority rights see  
Kelley, Judith G. (2004) Ethnic Politics in Europe. The Power of Norms and Incentives, Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press..   12 
Given the success of Eastern enlargement as a transformation tool for the consolidation of CEE de-
mocratic transition, the EU invoked membership conditionality as an instrument to stabilize another 
region that has been vital to its geopolitical interests: the Western Balkans. While the EU had been 
unable (and initially unwilling) to prevent military conflict in the region, it has been engaged in the 
stabilization and reconstruction since the early 1990s. The EU’s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) 
has provided emergency supplies, technical assistance and related support since the first war in 
1991. After the Kosovo conflict had broken out in 1998, the EU changed its approach toward the 
Western Balkans. It had become clear by now that development cooperation would not be sufficient 
to stabilize the region so close to the EU’s borders. The Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe of 
1999 promised candidate status to Croatia, Macedonia, Albania, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY), and Bosnia-Herzegovina as soon as they would meet the Copenhagen criteria. The Pact in-
troduced a political dialogue organized in three “working tables” on democratization and human 
rights, economic reconstruction and development, and security and justice and home affairs. The 
Commission would periodically assess whether the candidates complied with democracy, human 
rights, and the rule of law. Its assessment, annually published in regular reports, would determine 
whether the EU would sign a cooperation agreement providing additional incentives for political 
and economic reform, such as trade concessions and additional financial aid from PHARE. Next to 
funding  immediate  projects  of  democratization  and  economic  reconstruction,  the  Commission 
would grant selective incentives, such as autonomous trade preferences as a reward for specific re-
forms. The Stabilization and Accession Process (SAP) launched in 1999 reinforced the efforts of 
the EU to secure political and economic stability in the Western Balkans and bring them into the 
enlargement process. If the candidates satisfied political conditionality, they could open negotia-
tions with the EU for a Stability and Association Agreement (SAA) as the first formal step towards 
accession.  
The pre-accession strategy for the Western Balkans closely follows the CEE trajectory combining 
financial incentives with trade concessions in the shadow of membership conditionality (Kelley 
2006). Yet so far, EU membership has not motivated Balkan leaders very strongly to undertake the 
necessary reforms as was the case in Central and Eastern Europe, where regime transformation had 
been peaceful. Problems of economic backwardness, feeble state institutions, ethnic conflicts, and 
political extremism are much more severe due to the major wars the Balkan region had suffered. 
Membership puts up a far greater challenge than for the CEE countries and thus remains a rather   13 
distant prospect. The new financial instrument for pre-accession assistance introduced in 2007 is 
unlikely to change these unfavourable conditions.
11 
 
EU Neighbourhood Policy: Friends, not Members! 
The promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law also constitutes the core of the EU’s 
effort  in  achieving  political  and  economic  stability  in  its  immediate  neighbourhood.  Eastern 
enlargement  has  stretched  the  EU’s  backyard  considerably  East,  as  a  result  of  which  Russia, 
Ukraine,  and  some  of  the  Newly  Independent  States  have  been  admitted  to  the  club  of  “close 
friends”. Between 1997 and 1999, the EU entered eight partnership and cooperation agreements. 
The EU uses the same strategies and instruments to induce these countries into compliance with the 
Copenhagen criteria (Kelley 2006) – with one major exception. In sharp contrast to Central and 
South Eastern European countries, these agreements envision close trade relations and political co-
operation but not EU membership. They aim for a political dialogue on democracy, human rights, 
and the rule of law but did not contain a suspension clause, which only changed with the introduc-
tion of ENPI (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, which replaced TACIS and 
MEDA in 2007)
12. In cases of violation, the partners of the agreement could only take “appropriate 
measures”. Like PHARE and CARDS, TACIS (Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of In-
dependent States) provided and ENPI now provides financial assistance to political, legal and ad-
ministrative reforms aimed at promoting these political principles.  
In 2003, the EU launched its official European Neighbourhood Policy to offer a privileged relation-
ship to its immediate neighbours building upon a mutual commitment to common values (democ-
racy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable 
development). The ENP seeks to go beyond existing forms of cooperation offering a deeper politi-
cal relationship and economic integration. The central element of the European Neighbourhood Pol-
icy is the bilateral ENP Action Plans agreed between the EU and each partner. These set out an 
agenda of political and economic reforms with short and medium-term priorities. Implementation is 
jointly  promoted  and  monitored  through  sub-Committees  and  the  Commission,  which  closely 
evaluates the progress reports the partner countries have to submit on a regular basis. 
                                                 
11   Council Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006 of 17 July 2006 establishing an Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance 
(IPA), OJ L 210, 31.7.2006, p. 82–93. 
12   Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 laying down 
general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, OJ L 310, 9.11.2006, p. 1–
14.   14 
While the EU adopted a more bilateral approach to its far Eastern friends, its policy towards the 
Mediterranean neighbours has been based on a regional (multilateral) framework (for details see 
Bicchi 2007; Gomez 2003). The EU decided to upgrade its relations with the Mediterranean after 
the end of the Cold War and the rise of new security challenges in the Southern Mediterranean and 
the Middle East. As in the case of its development policy, the EU realized that preferential trade 
agreements  neither  reduced  the  development  gap  between  the  Mediterranean  countries  and  EU 
member states nor did they have an impact on democratic reforms. The “Barcelona Process”, estab-
lished by the Barcelona Declaration of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in 1995, sought to re-
launch the EU-Mediterranean cooperation and provide it with a multilateral framework. It identified 
three baskets
13 on which the new Euro-Mediterranean Partnership would focus: political stability 
and security, economic and financial cooperation, and cooperation on social, cultural and humani-
tarian issues. 
These goals were to be operationalized in a working programme and the EU provided financial and 
technical  assistance  for  its  implementation  through  MEDA  (Mediterranean  Development  Assis-
tance) and through loans of the European Investment Bank. As usual, political conditionality ap-
plied. The signatories of the Barcelona Declaration de facto subscribed to the Copenhagen criteria, 
which  are  not,  however,  mentioned.  Rather  the  Declaration  provided  a  catalogue  of  principles 
against which the cooperative behaviour of the participating countries could be assessed and be 
made subject to a political dialogue on the progress made. The MEDA Association Agreements re-
stated the provisions on democracy and human rights and include a suspension clause. Moreover, 
they established a bilateral political dialogue. In 1999, the newly established EIDHR took over 
MEDA, and since 2007, it is part of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. 
Since 2003, the EU has subsequently integrated its policies towards its Southern and Eastern friends 
into one common framework. Paradoxically, the one-size fits all approach seems to have shifted the 
EU’s relations with its Mediterranean back towards the original bilateral mode (see the paper of 
Andreas Stahn and Vera van Hüllen in this panel). 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership institutionalized an ongoing process of negotiations and con-
sultations among the governments and non-governmental actors across a wide range of issues. But 
there has been only little transition from dialogue to action. The Arab-Israeli conflict and the break-
down of the Middle East Process in 1996/97, in particular, have seriously obstructed the implemen-
                                                 
13   The similarity with CSCE terminology is no coincidence. It is reminiscent of the failed attempt to launch a Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean in 1990.   15 
tation of the Barcelona Working Programme. Measures on strengthening democracy and the respect 
for human rights have been sidelined by the gulf between the signatories on security issues and the 
rejection of EU interference with domestic policies by the Mediterranean countries. As a result, 
economic and financial cooperation has become the centre piece of the Barcelona process. MEDA 
Democracy has funded projects directed towards training and education on human rights and de-
mocracy,  awareness  campaigns,  women’s  rights  and  the  media.  However,  as  Federica  Bicchi 
(2006b) points out, MEDA Democracy tended to privilege partnerships between European NGOs 
and local NGOs. In particular, the EU has refused to fund groups that are considered Islamic, even 
though at least some of these groups form the cornerstone of civil society in the Arab world (Bicchi 
2006b). Furthermore, the EU’s difficulties with democracy promotion in the Middle East and its 
inherent  contradictions  resulting  from  conflicting  objectives  became  particularly  apparent  when 
Hamas, the terrorist organization that nevertheless provides most social services in Palestine, won 
the Palestinian elections in early 2006. It must be noted in this context that Palestinian governance 
is essentially on the payroll of the EU and its member states (ca. € 500 Mill./year). In order to rec-
oncile the conflicting goals of democracy promotion versus preventing the ultimate derailing of the 
Middle Eastern peace process resulted in an uneasy conditional engagement with the new Palestin-
ian government (Tocci 2006). 
While not belonging to its immediate neighbours, the EU has also intensified its cooperation with 
Asia and Latin America during the 1990s. Latin America receives EU financial assistance under the 
ALA  programme.  In  the  mid-1990s,  the  EU  signed  agreements  with  Mexico,  Chile  and  the 
MERCOSUR to prepare them for association. All three agreements create a framework for political 
dialogue on issues of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Chile was the first to conclude 
the association agreement in 2002. It contains provisions on democracy human rights, the rule of 
law, and good governance. 
In its relations with Asia, the EU has been less effective in pushing political conditionality. The co-
operation agreement between the EU and ASEAN, signed in 1980, did not contain any provisions 
on democracy and human rights. With its new Asian Strategy adopted in 1994, the EU has sought to 
intensify the political dialogue with Asian countries but issues of human rights and democracy have 
been largely banned from the agenda of the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM) established in 1996 and 
the talks within the regional forum of ASEAN (ARF). Bilateral cooperation agreements with India 
(1994), Sri Lanka (1995), Nepal (1997), Cambodia (1997), Vietnam (1997), Bangladesh (2000), 
and Pakistan (2001) contain democracy and human rights clauses. In contrast, China, South Korea, 
Laos, the Philippines, and Malaysia refused to have political conditionality included in their sectoral   16 
trade agreements with the EU. While the promotion of human rights and democracy has been incor-
porated in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Central Asian countries, there appears 
to be quite a gap between rhetoric and reality in the EU’s approach to the region (Warkotsch 2006). 
It remains to be seen whether the new Central Asian strategy promoted by the German EU presi-
dency is going to change the situation. The same is true for the new financial instrument of devel-
opment cooperation (DCI), which shall finance development projects in Central Asia, Asia, South 
Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. After all, DCI explicitly refers to democracy and hu-
man rights and contains a suspension clause (see above) 
 
The European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) 
As demonstrated above, the EU has mainstreamed its external relations with third countries with 
regard to the promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Since the Maastricht 
Treaty went into force in 1992, political conditionality has become mandatory in all formal agree-
ments between the EU and third countries. By 1995, these agreements also included suspension 
clauses in cases of democratic and human rights violations. Only few countries have been able to 
resist political conditionality, among them the U.S., Australia, and China. While democracy and 
human rights mainstreaming has been an incremental process, the EU passed two regulations in 
1999 as an attempt to establish a coherent framework for the EU’s global efforts in “developing and 
consolidating democracy and the rule of law and so that of respecting human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms in third countries”.
14 One Regulation covered operations within, the other operations 
outside the framework of EU development cooperation.
15 The part not related to EU development 
policy applied to operations implemented within the framework of existing programmes, such as 
TACIS, PHARE, or MEDA (Art. 2), which where replaced by the ENPI in 2007. The various pro-
grammes complemented each other in so far as the latter mostly allocate funds to institution- and 
capacity-building,  while  the  regulations  specifically  focus  on  democracy  and  human  rights  (in-
cluding administrative accountability and the fight against corruption, i.e. good governance). For 
the period of 1999 until 2004, the two regulations foresaw the allocation of € 410 mill. on technical 
and financial assistance, humanitarian aid, and other measures.  
The new framework provided the legal basis for measures under the European Initiative on Democ-
racy and Human Rights (EIDHR). The EIDHR is complementary to other EU programmes, such as 
                                                 
14   Council Regulation 976/1999 adopted on April 29, 1999, preamble, OJ 120/8 of May 8, 1999.  
15   Council Regulations 975/1999 and 976/1999 adopted on April 29, 1999, preamble, OJ 120/8 of May 8, 1999.   17 
PHARE, TACIS, MEDA, or CARDS, in that it can be implemented with partners other than na-
tional governments (and without their consent), and in particular with non-governmental organiza-
tions and international governments. Thus, EIDHR allows to circumvent the governments of the 
recipient countries and can be used even if other programs have been suspended, e.g. in cases of 
violations of human rights. In 1998, EIDHR integrated the democracy programmes under PHARE, 
TACIS, and MEDA. Since 1994, the EIDHR has provided funding (ca. € 100 mill./year) for pro-
jects that promote representative structures in both government and working place, access to reli-
able information, ethical practices in government and public service agencies, principles of equal 
opportunity and non-discrimination against minorities, respect for human rights, just to name a few.  
In the programming document for 2005 and 2006, the Commission thoroughly revised the EIDHR 
(see  Europäische  Kommission  2004  for  the  following;  see  also  European  Commission  2006). 
EIDHR was renamed into European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights.
16 As already 
mentioned, the Commission considered EIDHR superfluous after the creation of the new financial 
instruments of cooperation. However, thanks to the pressure of the European Parliament, the unique 
feature of EIDHR was preserved. Moreover, it advanced from a mere budget heading into a proper 
instrument for democracy promotion that distinguishes itself by providing support for NGOs and 
civil society organizations without having to rely on the consent of the governments of the recipient 
countries. The programming document (not available yet for the current period of 2007-2013) es-
tablished four so-called campaigns:  
1)  Promoting justice and the rule of law: This includes support for the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) and other international criminal tribunals and measures to combat the death penalty lead-
ing to its eventual abolition; 
2)  Fostering a culture of human rights: This includes strengthening civil society organizations, 
combating torture, and enhancing education and training on human rights; 
3)  Promoting the democratic process: This includes the various EU Election Observation Missions, 
but also measures to promote freedom of association and free media; 
4)  Advancing equality, tolerance, and peace: This includes awareness-raising measures against ra-
cism, for minority rights, and the rights of indigenous peoples. 
The programming document specified eligible regions and countries of the world for each of the 
various campaigns. As to the allocation of resources, ca. 40% of the money was allocated for pro-
moting the democratic process including electoral observation missions, while one third was de-
                                                 
16   Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on establishing 
a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide, OJ L 386, 29.12.2006, p. 1–11.   18 
voted to the campaign toward a culture of human rights. In particular, the Commission strongly en-
courages joint applications by EU based NGOs with civil society organizations in the target coun-
tries.  
The EIDHR is the only instrument comparable to the National Endowment for Democracy or the 
German party foundations allowing to circumvent the governments of the recipient countries. The 
debate about its future has triggered demands for an EU agency for providing democracy assistance. 
Thus, the European Parliament and political foundations have advanced a proposal for a “European 
Foundation for Democracy”. 
 
Evaluation 
For a long time and similar to most other Western political systems, the EU had ignored the promo-
tion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Its development policy mainly focused on 
economic cooperation. Moreover, the member states had made hardly any effort to bring their poli-
cies in line with the EU. Consequently, the role of the EU had been rather weak acting as an addi-
tional donor rather than a coordinator of European development policies (Stokke 1995). By 1999 at 
the latest, everything had changed. The EU now has a comprehensive strategy for the promotion of 
democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and  “good  governance” in place covering the entire 
globe. The various programmes concern accession candidates with a membership perspective, the 
“circle of friends” and immediate neighbours which are explicitly to be kept out of the union, as 
well as the ACP countries, Latin America, and Asia. The EU is making an explicit effort to project 
its own identity of a democratic polity into its relations with third countries. The goal of democracy 
promotion is enshrined in the EU treaties since the early 1990s, has been formulated in the 1999 
Regulations on Democracy and Human Rights in a comprehensive fashion and reinforced by the 
introduction of a whole set of new financial instruments on cooperation in 2007.  
The various policies consist of remarkably similar tools which usually encompass three types of in-
struments (see table 1). These instruments differ mainly with regard to the steering mechanisms by 
which democracy and human rights are being diffused. First, “political dialogues” use persuasion 
and learning strategies. Second, political conditionality clauses try to manipulate cost-benefit calcu-
lations through creating incentive structures (positive and negative). Finally, there are various pro-
grammes in place geared toward capacity-building for institutionalizing democracy, human rights, 
and the rule of law.   19 
The most remarkable feature of these three types of instruments is their similarity across regions. 
The EU follows one single cultural script that it uses to promote democracy, human rights, and the 
rule of law across the globe. With EIDHR at the latest, policy goals and instruments have been 
streamlined and written into the union’s standard operating procedures. If the programmes vary at 
all, it concerns their budgetary allocations. While the programmes and instruments appear to be 
strikingly similar, this does not mean that the EU ignores local conditions or applies these instru-
ments in a uniform way. Indeed, the empowerment of the EU Delegations in the various countries 
in the implementation and management of these programmes together with the de-centralization of 
their administration should lead to a greater sensitivity to the varying political, economic, and cul-
tural situations on the ground.  
 










































































































How does this EU approach to the promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law per-
form with regard to the criteria of a “civilian power’s” role identity developed above? In general,   20 
the conformity between the identity of a “civilian power” and the EU’s programs to promote de-
mocracy and the rule of law worldwide is striking. This begins with the measures to sustain the le-
galization of world politics through the International Criminal Court and other international legal 
instruments and ends with support for local human rights NGOs in various countries. Interestingly 
enough, the programs are also fairly consistent with the EU Security Strategy (European Council 
2003). The EU approach reflects its preference for “soft security” and “soft power” in its foreign 
policy inducing compliance with its policies by incentives, capacity-building, and persuasion and 
learning. Compliance management rather than enforcement does not only correspond to the EU 
self-understanding as a civilian power. In the absence of uniform criteria for the evaluation of com-
pliance and application of sanctions in case of violation, a cooperative and process-oriented ap-
proach allows to develop a common understanding of the behavioural requirements under the Co-
penhagen criteria. Socialization also appears to be more promising since the EU has no means of 
forcing the more than 120 countries with which it signed cooperation and association agreements 
into compliance with democracy and human rights norms. This is often overlooked by the human 
rights community and by scholars alike who question the EU’s sincerity in these programs, because 
it mainly uses carrots rather than sticks.  
Of course, implementation on the ground is a different matter. The EU is often using double stan-
dards when dealing with human rights violators. It is tough on Myanmar, but rather soft on China. 
In many cases, it does not use the instruments available in the various partnership agreements or 
uses them only reluctantly (see e.g. Youngs 2004; Santos 2006; Kelley 2006). Nevertheless, a quan-
titative study by Hadewych Hazelzet of the use of EU carrots and sticks in its human rights policies 
during the 1990s did not reveal a particular bias in one way or the other. In particular, Hazelzet 
tested various “realist” hypotheses in order to get a measurement for supposedly strategic security 
and economic interests, but these hypotheses could not be verified (Hazelzet 2001). In short, it is 
certainly true that the EU human rights and democracy promotion policies are implemented in a dif-
ferential way and that these norms do not always trump other concerns. But it is equally true that 
the standard rationalist account according to which economic and security concerns are usually 
prior to democracy and human rights goals, cannot be confirmed, either. 
One should not overlook in this context that the evolution of EU democracy promotion programmes 
did not follow a grand design, but incremental “learning by doing” (see also Kelley 2006). The pol-
icy instruments of conditionality were first developed in relations with the ACP countries as part of 
the  1990  Lomé  IV  agreement.  From  there,  the  Commission  quickly  introduced  conditionality 
clauses into the so-called Europe Agreements with the Central Eastern European countries during   21 
the early 1990s. By the mid-1990s, political conditionality had become an essential ingredient of the 
EU strategy for democracy promotion. 
A similar process of a new instrument travelling from one EU regional strategy to another can be 
observed with regard to capacity building including knowledge and financial transfer. In this con-
text, it was the PHARE programme for Central Eastern Europe which was initially developed for 
Poland and Hungary in 1989. One year later, TACIS was created to help the transition process in 
Russia and the Soviet successor states. The experiences with PHARE and TACIS were then used to 
build the CARDS programme for the Western Balkans and the former Soviet Republics, and the 
MEDA programme for the Mediterranean region. The regional programmes were finally replaced in 
2007 by a set of new instruments that mainstream democracy promotion and differ only in the type 
rather than the geographical location of the recipient countries. 
In sum, in the course of the 1990s, the EU has embarked on a major effort at “value export” that 
tries to incorporate the promotion of a specific European version of democracy into its external rela-
tions with the rest of the world. In this regard, the EU is surprisingly explicit about promoting a par-
ticular democratic self-understanding and identity distinguishing itself from, e.g., the U.S. version 
of democracy and capitalism. Examples for such identity markers in the human rights area include 
the opposition to the death penalty and an emphasis on social and economic rights. Concerning re-
gional cooperation, the EU tries to promote its own model of regional integration, i.e., including 
strong supranational institutions and going beyond mere free trade areas. In Latin America, for ex-
ample, the U.S. and the EU seem to compete in advertising their preferred models of regional inte-
gration. As Bicchi points out with regard to the Mediterranean, this externalization of one’s own 
institutional design can be well explained by sociological institutionalism’s emphasis on institu-
tional isomorphism (see Bicchi 2006a referring to DiMaggio and Powell 1991). 
EU democracy and human rights promotion might be considered an easy case to confirm the iden-
tity of a “civilian power.” Therefore we will now turn to the ESDP and EU peacekeeping missions 
which have been labelled by some as the militarization of EU foreign policy (e.g. Manners 2006; 
similarly Smith 2000). We will explore the extent to which the EU’s identity as a civilian power has 
prevailed also after it started to develop some significant military capabilities. 
 
4. The EU and Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management, and Peacekeeping Missions 
In 2003, just when the Iraq crisis dwarfed once again the EU’s attempt to develop an effective 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU launched its first autonomous military opera-  22 
tion. While the member state were deeply divided over US military intervention in Iraq, on March 
31, 2003 EU forces took over NATO’s Operation Allied Harmony in the Former Yugoslav Repub-
lic of Macedonia (FYROM). On January 1, 2003, only two months before, the EU had launched its 
first-ever  civilian  crisis  management  operation.  The  EU  Police  Mission  (EUPM)  replaced  the 
United Nations’ International Police Task Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina seeking to establish law 
enforcement capabilities at the local level. Both EU missions have been part of UN Peace-Keeping 
Operations.  
Since 2003, the EU has launched altogether seventeen missions within the framework of the ESDP. 
Among them are (see the database in Abellan 2007) 
•  Police missions: EUPM (mentioned above); Proxima (FYR Macedonia, 2003-2005); EUPAT 
(FYR Macedonia, 2005-2006); EUPOL COPPS (Palestine, since 2006); EUPOL Kinshasa (DR 
Congo, since 2004);  
•  Border assistance missions: Border Assistance to Moldova and Ukraine (since 2005); EUBAM 
Rafah (Palestine, since 2005); 
•  Missions  to  support  the  rule  of  law:  EUJUST Themis  (Georgia,  2004-2005);  EUJUST  Lex 
(Iraq, since 2006); EUPT Kosovo (since 2006); 
•  Monitoring and security sector reform missions: AMM (Banda Aceh, 2005-2006); EUSEC DR 
Congo (since 2005); AMIS II (Sudan, since 2006); 
•  Last  not  least,  military  peacekeeping  operations:  Concordia  (FYR  Macedonia,  400  troops, 
2003); Artemis (DR Congo, 1800 troops, 2003); EUFOR Althea (Bosnia-Hercegovina, 7000 
troops, since 2004); EUFOR DRCongo (1450 troops, 2006). 
In addition, one should mention the substantial EU engagement in the post-conflict reconstruction 
and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan where the EU is the largest single donor of humanitarian 
assistance. Moreover, EU member states such as Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands 
and others provide troops for the NATO led “International Security Assistance Force” (ISAF) and 
for “Operation Enduring Freedom,” the US-led war on terror against Al Quaeda and the Taliban 
(details in Gross 2006).  
Finally, the EU and its member states are heavily involved in the Middle Eastern conflicts. For quite 
a while, the EU has been involved in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and maintains two ESDP mis-
sions in Palestine. The E3 (Britain, France, Germany), the other permanent members of the UN Se-
curity Council, and the EU High Representative are engaged in the diplomatic effort to prevent Iran 
from acquiring nuclear weapons. Individual EU member states such as Britain still deploy troops in 
Iraq and are engaged in the stabilization efforts there. Most recently and probably most significantly   23 
with regard to the long-term consequences, EU member states – with the explicit approval of the 
EU General Affairs and External Relations Council – lead and supply more than half of the troops 
monitoring and enforcing the ceasefire in Lebanon that ended the armed conflict between the Hiz-
bollah militia and the Israeli Defense Forces. While UNIFIL II constitutes a UN peacekeeping op-
eration mandated by Security Council Resolution 1701 of 11 August 2006, EU members have taken 
the lead in this mission (details in Dembinski 2007). 
The military component of ESDP was systematically introduced by the European Councils in Hel-
sinki (1999) and Nice (2000). In Helsinki, the EU member states decided to establish the “headline 
goal” of an EU military intervention force, i.e. the capacity of the EU to deploy within 60 days, and 
sustain for at least one year, up to 60.000 troops. The Nice Treaty established a new crisis manage-
ment system for EU-led military operations. As in CFSP, member states are directly responsible for 
initiating and implementing EU military crisis management operations. Decisions to launch military 
– as well as civilian – operations take the form of joint actions agreed in the General Affairs and 
External Relations Council (GAERC). The rotating Presidency of the Council and the Secretary-
General/High Representative of CFSP also exercise powers of initiative. The Commission and the 
European Parliament, by contrast, are merely informed and not directly involved in any decisions 
taken. The newly established Political and Security Committee (PSC) keeps track of international 
developments, helps define policies and monitors implementation of agreed policies. The latest de-
velopment to strengthen military crisis management was the commitment of the member states in 
2004 to the establishment of 13 EU Battlegroups. They shall form the core of a rapid reaction force 
of 1.500 troops deployable within 10 days for a period of 30 to 120 days. 
The civilian component of ESDP was developed by the European Councils of Feira (2000) and 
Gothenburg (2001). In Feira, the member states established the headline goals for civilian crisis 
management in four areas: 
•  police cooperation: the capacity of the EU to deploy 5.000 police officers, including 1.000 
within 30 days, for tasks ranging from restoring order in cooperation with military forces to the 
training of local police; 
•  strengthening the rule of law: the possibility of providing up to 200 judges, prosecutors, and 
other legal experts; 
•  civilian administration: the possibility of providing a team to prepare or monitor elections, taxa-
tion, education, water provision etc.   24 
•  civilian protection: possibility of assisting humanitarian actions through emergency operations, 
i.e. the immediate deployment of two to three assessment teams of ten experts each as well as 
intervention teams of 2.000 persons. 
The third component of ESDP – next to military and civilian crisis management – is conflict pre-
vention. It seeks to establish/restore a favourable political and economic environment in precarious 
regions. Since conflict prevention entails a comprehensive set of instruments that cut across all 
three pillars of the European Union, the role of the European Commission is key. It shall ensure the 
integration  and  consistency  of  all  EU  action.  Next  to  developing  an  early-warning  system,  the 
European Commission focuses on developing crisis management instruments, such as the Rapid 
Reaction Mechanism introduced in 2000, enabling the Commission to rapidly disburse funds to 
conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction projects. 
The EU policy toward Peace-Keeping Operations is firmly integrated in an overall framework of 
crisis management, which the EU most explicitly laid out in its European Security Strategy (ESS; 
European Council 2003). The ESS defines democracy, human rights, and the rule of law as the core 
European values, on which the EU has been built and which shape its vision of the world. This vi-
sion is based on the premise that creating a democratic society is the best way to achieve peace, sta-
bility and wealth. The ESS also lays out the two sets of instruments by which these goals are to be 
achieved: “soft power” and “effective multilateralism” (ESS, pp. 9-10). Thus, the EU involvement 
in UN Peace-Keeping Operations in Former Yugoslavia and the Democratic Republic of Congo has 
to be seen as part of a greater effort on which the EU has embarked to export its values in order to 
bring peace and stability to other countries and regions, particularly but not exclusively in its close 
neighbourhood.  
In sum, within a relatively short period of time, namely five years, the EU has become a major 
player  in  post-conflict  peace-building  and  reconstruction  efforts  including  robust  peacekeeping. 
With regard to the latter, EU members provide by far the largest number of troops in the various 
missions, be it under UN auspices, under NATO or under EU command.
17 All EU-led military 
peacekeeping operations are legitimized by UN Security Council resolutions, normally under Chap-
ter VII of the UN Charter. As a result, the EU is now a major subcontractor of the UN with regard 
to peacekeeping. It should also be noted that the EU missions are embedded in larger political stabi-
lization and peacebuilding efforts that include the promotion of democracy, human rights, and the 
rule of law, as described above. Take EUFOR DR Congo, for example: While it has been rightly 
                                                 
17   Note that the U.S. usually does not provide troops in multilateral peacekeeping operations.   25 
criticized as too limited in scope and timescale (see Gegout 2007), the EU spent € 750 million in 
Congo on development, economic, and humanitarian aid including sponsoring the elections in 2006. 
For an international body, this is quite unique. It enables the EU to provide a whole package of po-
litical, economic, social, cultural, and military measures in crisis prevention, crisis management, 
and post-conflict situations even though coordination between the various EU agencies and the EU 
delegations on the ground is often problematic. 
 
Evaluation: Still a Civilian Power? 
How are the increasing military role of the EU and the various military missions to be evaluated? 
Are we seeing the gradual militarization of European foreign policy, is Venus approaching Mars, to 
use Kagan’s famous term (Kagan 2003; see also Smith 2000)? We argue that, quite on the contrary, 
the EU is only recently emerging as a civilian world power, precisely because it only now disposes 
of the entire spectrum of policy instruments necessary to effectively promote the “civilization” of 
international relations. In that sense, the recent ESDP missions constitute the first signs that the EU 
is actually taking “effective multilateralism” seriously and that EU puts its money where its “civiliz-
ing” mouth is. 
As argued above, civilian power requires “efforts at constraining the use of force in settling political 
conflicts, both within and between states” as well as the “promotion of non-violent forms of conflict 
management and conflict resolution” (Harnisch and Maull 2001b, 4). The emerging conflict preven-
tion, crisis management, and post-conflict peace-building role of the EU that includes robust peace-
keeping is consistent with these criteria. First, EU operations since 2003 have proven that the EU is 
willing and capable of reacting to ongoing and emerging humanitarian and security crises, by using 
both military and civilian instruments of crisis management. While the immediate goal is the provi-
sion of security and stability, all EU missions have been linked to the long-term goal of state-
building and democracy promotion that require civilian rather than military measures. Thus, the 
ESS puts strong emphasis on security sector reform as an important condition for successful state-
building and democratic transformation (cf. Osland 2004). A major focus is the (democratic) con-
trol of those actors who command executive and coercive power. This is why all EU missions have 
made training and monitoring police forces a major if not the exclusive priority. All military opera-
tions have been complemented or followed-up by so called civilian EUPOL missions for the build-
ing and reforming of police institutions.  
While EU missions in the framework of ESDP focus on security issues, they are embedded in civil-
ian measures aiming at the economic and political development of the target state. In case of Mace-  26 
donia, for instance, the military operation was not only followed by a police mission; it was also 
backed up by substantial financial assistance from the CARDS
18 institutional reform and emergency 
assistance programmes, e.g. for the drafting of a law on local self-government that formed another 
key element of the Ohrid Agreement. Moreover, the perspective of a Stabilization and Association 
Agreement with the EU provided a main incentive for the Macedonian government to move for-
ward the implementation of the law. 
Second, all EU missions have been firmly embedded in a multilateral framework. They were either 
requested or at least endorsed by the UN and – with the exception of Artemis in Congo – supported 
by NATO assets. The EU explicitly recognizes the UN Security Council as primary responsible for 
the maintenance of international peace and security (see Dembinski and Brock 2004). In their Joint 
Declaration on EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management, the two organizations committed them-
selves to establishing a joint consultative mechanism (Steering Committee) to examine ways of en-
hancing mutual cooperation in planning, training, communication and the exchange of best practice. 
The two organizations agreed to develop mutually reinforcing approaches to conflict prevention and 
to ensure that the EU’s evolving military and civilian capacities would provide real added value for 
UN crisis management. EUPOL Kinshasa served as a first test operation demonstrating that the EU 
can contribute effectively to UN peace-keeping operations.  
Against initial worries, the capacity of the EU for autonomous operations under ESPD has not dis-
tracted European contributions to UN peace-keeping. While EU member states are very reluctant to 
place their troops under UN command,
19 they  contribute 39% of the UN peace-keeping budget 
(compared to 22% of the US) and 36,8% of the regular budget (compared to 27% of the US) (cf. 
Tardy, 2005: 51). Moreover, the general absence of EU states from UN-led operations has to be 
checked against their presence in UN-mandated operations. The EU does not consider a UN man-
date necessary for operations that are deployed in Europe, with the consent of the host state, and of 
non-coercive nature. But the UN has usually endorsed EU missions and the two organizations have 
closely cooperated in case of a UN involvement. The EU has proven itself as a reliable “burden-
sharing” partner, particularly in areas where the UN is the weakest: rapid reaction to humanitarian 
crisis, on the one hand, and sustainable post-conflict management, on the other (cf. Novosseloff 
2004; Tardy 2005). The EU-UN cooperation in the field of military and civilian crisis management 
                                                 
18   In 2002, the EU gave 63,5 million Euros in aid to Macedonia (cf. Mace, Catriona (2003) 'Operation Concordia: De-
veloping a 'European' approach to crisis management', International Peacekeeping 11, 3: 474-491.: 479). 
19   EU member states only account for 6.52 % of UN troops (cf. Tardy, 2005: 52). Moreover, EU member states have 
dismissed the request of the UN to “re-hat” some of their assets when handing responsibilities over to the UN, e.g. 
after the departure of ARTEMIS from Congo.   27 
has developed faster and deeper compared to any other regional organization, such as NATO. Many 
see it as a model for the cooperation between the UN and the African Union, for example (cf. 
Tardy, 2005).  
The EU also cooperates with other international and regional organizations, such as the OSCE in 
the Western Balkans (Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) and the periphery of Russia (Georgia, 
Ukraine, and Moldava), the African Union (Sudan), and ASEAN (Aceh/Indonesia). The coopera-
tion with NATO is of particular relevance. The Berlin Plus Agreement provides a framework for the 
coordination of military action.
20 It is a series of arrangements for EU access to NATO assets and 
capabilities. The cooperation with NATO has not only enhanced the still weak military operational 
capabilities of the EU. It has also prevented a rift with the U.S. and its major European allies, nota-
bly the UK and Turkey, which do not want ESDP to become a rival to NATO and transatlantic mili-
tary cooperation with the US. However, relations between NATO and the EU are still sensitive. 
There is a serious lack of coordination on the ground, e.g. in places such as Afghanistan. This has 
led to quite some concern about the prioritization between military and political means in the recon-
struction effort which has only recently been clarified (quote). 
In general, however, the EU’s increasing role in inter- and intra-national conflict resolution and 
peace-building is fully consistent with the foreign policy of a “civilian power” as identified above. 
The EU eschews purely military security concerns in favour of security sector reform. In order to 
induce compliance with its security policies, the EU relies on capacity-building and positive condi-
tionality rather than sanctions and coercive power. While the EU does not preclude the use of mili-
tary force, military operations are integrated in the overall framework of crisis management that 
combines the use of financial, civilian and military instruments. The EU is thus not only able to en-
force and maintain peace, but also seeks to maintain law and order and build peace. 
 
5. Conclusions: An Emerging Civilian World Power 
We have argued in this paper that the EU’s role in the promotion of democracy, human rights, and 
the rule of law  as well as its  engagement in  conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-
conflict peace-building and reconstruction is fully consistent with a foreign policy identity of a “ci-
                                                 
20   Berlin Plus builds on the arrangements concluded in Berlin in June 1996, which served as a basis for cooperation 
between the West European Union (WEU) and NATO (cf. Haine, Jean-Yves (2004) Berlin PLUS: Institute for Se-
curity Studies.). It includes four major elements: assured access to NATO planning; presumption of availability of 
pre-identified NATO common assets and capabilities; European command options including the role of the NATO 
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Allied Forces, Europe; and a NATO-EU Security Information Agreement.   28 
vilian power” that emphasizes peaceful means of conflict resolution, principled, but effective multi-
lateralism, as well as the legalization and democratization of world affairs. In fact and contrary to 
some arguments in the literature, we would argue that the EU has assumed the role of a civilian 
power only recently and after the end of the Cold War. “Civilian power” requires pro-active foreign 
policies and it necessitates that a polity has the whole range of political, economic, cultural, and 
military instruments at its disposal. If we use this yardstick, one could argue that the EU only be-
came a “civilian power” at about 2000. By that time, the various strategies and instruments for the 
promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, had been integrated into a common 
framework. Moreover, only around the turn of the century was the EU capable to assume an active 
role in peacekeeping through the gradual buildup of the ESDP. The European Security Strategy 
(ESS) was then the first attempt at formulating a comprehensive foreign policy strategy.  
Since the early 1990s, the EU has tried to systematically incorporate the promotion of a specific set 
of European values into its external relations. In this regard, the EU is surprisingly explicit about 
projecting a particular identity distinguishing itself from the US, particularly with regard to princi-
pled, but effective multilateralism. It is the combination of civilian and military resources to manage 
violent conflict where the EU sees its main contribution to international security. 
Yet, the civilian power EU still faces two major obstacles in becoming an effective and coherent 
actor regarding crisis management and conflict resolution: intergovernmental decision-making in 
ESDP, on the one hand, and the separation of military and civilian crisis management operations in 
the  second  (ESDP/CFSP)  and  third  pillars  (JHA)  from  programmes  managed  by  the  European 
Commission in the first pillar (humanitarian and development aid, trade policy, environmental and 
social policy), on the other (cf. Gourlay 2004). These two factors also hamper the capacity of the 
EU to implement the integrated and comprehensive approach aspired by the European Security 
Strategy. Yet, one should not overlook that the intergovernmental nature of ESDP and the EU’s 
complex and cross-pillarized decision-making structure might have some beneficial elements: It 
institutionally prevents the militarization of EU foreign policy and the emergence of a European 
“supranational security state.” 
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